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In July 2016, Turkey was shaken by a bloody coup attempt. Although the would-be putschists failed, their
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potentially disruptive affordances of social media platforms. The report then focuses on the emerging policy
developments and online restrictions in the aftermath of the coup attempt, which include 1) the closure of the
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Providers) and interception of digital communications by way of decree laws, 3) facilitation of social media
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Introduction 
In July 2016, Turkey was shaken by a bloody 
coup attempt. Although the would-be putschists 
failed, their insurgency led to an unprecedented 
reshuffling of Turkey’s political economic and 
socio-cultural landscapes. Notwithstanding the 
critical reverberations on the army, judiciary, law 
enforcement and civil society, the abortive coup set 
in motion a massive purge of civil servants, closure 
of media outlets, arrests of journalists, and blocking 
of websites and social media accounts.
This report offers an examination of the 
evolution of internet policy in Turkey from the early 
2000s to the post-coup conjuncture. It begins with 
an overview of internet legislation in Turkey during 
the 2000s under the AKP government (Justice and 
Development Party), and proceeds to discuss the 
deployment of different forms of control between 
2013-2016 to contain the fallout from political 
and security crises and the potentially disruptive 
affordances of social media platforms.1  Following 
this overview, the report focuses on the emerging 
policy developments and online restrictions in the 
aftermath of the coup attempt, which include 1) the 
closure of the TIB—Turkey’s telecommunications 
authority, 2) direct government control of ISPs 
(Internet Service Providers) and interception of 
digital communications by way of decree laws, 3) 
facilitation of social media censorship by means of 
Twitter, Facebook and YouTube content removals 
1 R. Deibert and R. Rohozinski, ‘Control and Subversion in 
Russian Cyberspace’ In Access Controlled: The Shaping of 
Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace, edited by R. Deibert, 
J. Palfrey, R. Rohozinski and J. Zittrain, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2010, pp. 15-34.
and 4) coordinated online harassment campaigns 
by pro-government users against alleged coup 
planners, Kurdish activists and government critics in 
general.
To gain insights into these developments, this 
report draws extensively on literature both in 
Turkish and English and is based on the following 
methods: 1) document analysis of existing internet 
legislation, Turkish Official Gazette announcements 
concerning the decree laws, and government officials’ 
statements, 2) quantitative analysis of open source 
data on social media censorship (crowdsourced data 
on banned websites; Twitter, Facebook and Google 
transparency reports; Lumen database on Turkish 
court orders; traffic data on throttling), 3) analysis 
of Twitter activity in the months before and after 
the coup attempt, and 4) select semi-structured 
interviews with internet activists and legal scholars.
The key finding of the report is that the AKP’s 
post-coup strategies concerning the internet are 
culminating in a distributed network of government 
and non-government actors using hard and soft 
forms of control. While the AKP continues to deploy 
existing Internet Law, Anti-Terror Law and Press Law 
provisions and further expands its online hegemony 
by way of decree laws, its post-coup internet policy 
has also come to rely on the opaque activities of 
users and groups who are affiliated with government 
officials, party members and partisan media outlets 
and whose primary objective is to target and harass 
government critics on social media, and intimidate 
those who dissent. As these actors take on the 
responsibility of online monitoring, hacking and 
“snitching,” it becomes increasingly difficult for users 
and activists to trace online restrictions to a specific 
government agency or legislation and to seek legal 
remedies.
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Overview of Turkey’s 
 Internet Policy    
I. 1993-2007: Absence of regulation 
In the early 1990s, internet in Turkey was in the 
purview of academic and research institutions. 
Following the creation of a national backbone in 
1996 and the consequent rise of a competitive ISP 
market, internet became a commercial medium 
in the latter half of the decade, registering steady 
growth in use and introducing various technological 
and socio-cultural changes. However, it remained 
largely unregulated primarily because of the then-
coalition governments’ disregard for the need to 
develop new policies for a new medium, and was 
primarily managed and controlled by the courts that 
focused on criminalization of certain online activities. 
The earliest examples of such court decisions 
can be traced back to separate cases in 1997 and 
2001 when two individuals were prosecuted for 
their statements on online forums that allegedly 
criticized and offended the Turkish police and state 
institutions.2  
On the other hand, the first website blocking took 
place in 2002 when a military court ordered a website 
to shut down due to the publication of documents 
concerning alleged corruption within the Turkish Air 
Force.3 The first mass website blocking happened in 
2005-2006 when more than a dozen websites were 
blocked by the courts on copyright infringement 
grounds because they provided hyperlinks to 
downloadable audio files or software to obtain 
such files.4 These practices of ad hoc criminalization 
and prosecution in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
2  K. Altintas, T. Aydin and V. Akman, ‘Censoring the 
Internet: The Situation in Turkey’, First Monday, June 3, 
2002, http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/
view/962/883, (accessed November 27, 2016). 
3  S. Özalp, ‘Genel Kurmay Yolsuzluk.com Sitesini 
Kapattırdı’, Türk İnternet, March 4, 2002. Accessed No-
vember 25, 2016 http://www.turk-internet.com/portal/
yazigoster.php?yaziid=3352, (accessed November 27, 
2016). 
4 M. Akgül and M. Kırlıdoğ, ‘Internet censorship in 
Turkey’, Internet Policy Review, Volume 4, Issue 2, DOI: 
10.14763/2015.2.366, https://policyreview.info/articles/
analysis/internet-censorship-turkey, (accessed November 
27, 2016).
and the absence of a systematic policy-making and 
public debate concerning the role of the internet in 
society set the stage for more stringent policies in 
following years. 
II. 2007-2013: Regulation-cum-control
Turkey passed its first internet-specific legislation 
in 2007, which was titled “Law No. 5651, Regulation 
of Publications on the Internet and Suppression of 
Crimes Committed by means of Such Publications.” It 
was propelled by fears around moral issues involving 
teen sexuality, pornography, drug use, video games 
and violence that swept the nation in the early 2000s, 
and was therefore designed to protect users from so-
called illegal and harmful content. The “Internet Law” 
as it was commonly known, charged the Presidency 
of Telecommunications and Communication (TIB in 
its Turkish acronym) with administrative duties such 
as monitoring content and mandating hosting and 
access providers to combat categorical crimes. The 
law set forth seven categorical crimes (incitement 
to suicide, facilitation of the use of narcotics, child 
pornography, obscenity, prostitution, facilitation of 
gambling, and slandering of the legacy of Ataturk—
the founder of modern Turkey), and stipulated 
that a website could be blocked by court order or 
an administrative order issued by the TIB if it was 
found to be committing one of these crimes. It also 
obliged hosting and access providers to monitor 
online content that was transmitted through their 
infrastructure and required them to ban access 
to illegal content once they were served with a 
court order or a TIB-issued notice. According to 
the Internet Law, mass use providers (e.g. internet 
cafes) were required to obtain “activity certificates” 
from local authorities and to block access to illegal 
content by using the TIB-approved filters. 
To penalize online content that fell outside the 
purview of the Internet Law, Turkish authorities 
deployed other legislation including the Penal Code 
to criminalize online speech that insults the Turkish 
nation, government agencies or the military; the 
Anti-Terror Law to curb political speech regarding 
the Kurdish issue and ethnic minority rights; and 
the Intellectual Property Law to penalize content 
providers for illegally publishing copyrighted 
material. 
Given the combined use of the Internet Law 
with the above-mentioned legislation, the late 
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Table 1: Number of websites blocked in Turkey
Year Annual Cumulative
2008 1,310 1,310
2009 4,644 5,954
2010 2,593 8,547
2011 7,012 15,559
2012 7,082 22,641
2013 17,837 40,478
2014 25,061 65,539
2015 42,236 107,775
2016 8,030 115,805
2000s witnessed the construction of an extensive 
mechanism of control. Based on the above-
mentioned political, social and cultural anxieties, the 
number of blocked websites grew exponentially, with 
93 percent of them blocked by TIB’s administrative 
orders.5
These 93% of blocked websites mentioned above 
were banned mainly on grounds of obscenity. They 
were identified via word-based filtering methods 
and comprised of content related to erotica, dating, 
and/or LGBTI rights. 6 In 2011, the TIB created a 
list of 138 words that included çıplak (naked), itiraf 
(confession), escort, hot, anal, etc., and asked Turkish 
hosting companies to ban domain names including 
any of these words.7
5 In 2009, the TIB stopped releasing the number of 
blocked websites creating a serious transparency 
problem. Since then legal scholars, internet activists and 
a citizen initiative called EngelliWeb (“Disabled Web”) 
have been tracking the number of blocked websites. 
The annual and cumulative number of blocked websites 
were calculated using the Internet Archive. The numbers 
pertaining to administrative orders were culled from 
EngelliWeb’s own statistics. See: Internet Archive, 
Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/web/*/https://
engelliweb.com/, (accessed November 27, 2016). Engelli 
Web, ‘Kurum Bazından İstatistikler’, November 27, 2016, 
https://engelliweb.com/istatistikler/, (accessed November 
27, 2016).
6 Kuşburnu, ‘Türkiye’de Internet Sansürünün Son 
6 Yılı’, Kame, July 9, 2015, https://network23.org/
kame/2015/07/09/turkiyede-internet-sansurunun-son-6-
yili/, (accessed November 27, 2016).
7 ‘Turkey Forbids ‘Forbidden’ from Internet Domain 
In addition to websites, Turkish authorities 
blocked several social networking and/or 
collaborative sites (e.g. YouTube, MySpace, 
Dailymotion, Vimeo, Blogspot, Last.fm) because of a 
single case of offending content or on the grounds 
of copyright infringement. While some of these sites 
were banned intermittently, YouTube remained 
notoriously inaccessible between 2008 and 2010, 
and continued to receive more than 30 court orders 
for closure until 2014.8 
Regarding the introduction of filtering systems 
and the administrative decisions to ban certain 
domain names, Turkish authorities were especially 
concerned with the protection of children 
and families. For example, the Information 
and Communication Technologies Board (Bilgi 
Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu, known by its Turkish 
acronym, BTK), the government agency responsible 
for the regulation of the telecommunications 
industry, launched a program dubbed the “Safe Use 
of the Internet” in 2011. The BTK required all users 
to install a filtering system in their computers and to 
choose from four packages (child, family, domestic, 
and standard). Faced with strong reaction from 
academics, legal scholars and civic organizations, 
the BTK modified the program to be non-mandatory 
and offered two filtering options instead (child and 
family).9 Although the family filter is optional for 
individual users, it is mandatory for public access 
sites such as internet cafes. While the BTK declines 
to provide a complete list of websites blocked by the 
family filter, the mandatory filtering software used 
at internet cafes reportedly blocks more than 1.5 
million websites.10
Names,’ Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review 
(Istanbul), April 28, 2011, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.
com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n =turkey-forbids-
8216forbidden8217-from-internet-domain-
names-2011-04-28, (accessed November 27, 2016).
8 M. Akgül and M. Kırlıdoğ, op. cit.
9 Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2012: Turkey, 
September 24, 2012, https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-net/2012/turkey, (accessed November 27, 
2016).
10 Kuşburnu, ‘Türkiye’de Kaç Websitesi Sansürlü?’, 
Kame, September 20, 2015, https://network23.org/
kame/2015/09/20/turkiyede-kac-websitesi-sansurlu/, 
(accessed November 27, 2016).
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III.  2013-2016: Tightening the noose
Legal and technological restrictions that were 
primarily driven by the urge to protect family values 
and/or national unity during the 2000s began to 
intensify in the following decade. Faced with two 
major legitimacy crises, first the nationwide anti-
government Gezi protests in June 2013, and then 
revelations about a massive corruption scandal 
in December 2013, the AKP government imposed 
further restrictions to combat the perceived threats 
of digital communications. 
During the Gezi protests, various actors resorted 
to social media to organize, gather and share news, 
and express underlying disenchantment with 
the AKP government.11 The AKP’s response was 
generally to demonize the internet and social media 
platforms, as seen in Erdogan’s labeling of Twitter as 
a “menace” and “a curse on societies” that harbors 
“all sorts of lies.”12 There were also announcements 
by government officials about imminent restrictions 
to be placed on online communications to maintain 
public safety and order and to prevent so-called 
cyber-crimes.13
11 ‘A Breakout Role for Twitter? The Role of Social Media 
during the Turkish Protests’ Social Media and Political 
Participation (SMaPP) Data Report, New York University, 
June 1, 2013, https://18798-presscdn-pagely.netdna-ssl.
com/smapp/wp-content/uploads/sites/1693/2016/04/
turkey_data_report.pdf, (accessed November 27, 2016). 
S. Kuzuloglu, ‘Gezi Parkı Eylemlerinin Sosyal Medya 
Karnesi.’ Radikal, June 19, 2013, http://www.radikal.com.
tr/yazarlar/m_serdar_kuzuloglu/gezi_parki_eylemlerinin_
sosyal_medya_karnesi-1138146, (accessed November 
27, 2016). D. Ergurel, ‘The Role of Social Networks in 
#OccupyGezi Protests.’ Today’s Zaman, June 2, 2013, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20141018012744/http://
www.todayszaman.com/blog/deniz-ergurel/the-role-of-
social-networks-in-occupygezi-protests_317224.html, 
(accessed November 27, 2016). D. Dlugoleski, ‘We Are 
All Journalists Now.’ Columbia Journalism Review, May 
20, 2013, http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/turkey_
counter_media.php, (accessed November 27, 2016). 
12 Z. Tufekci, ‘Everyone Is Getting Turkey’s Twitter Block 
Wrong.’ Medium, 2014. https://medium.com/technology-
and-society/everyone-is-getting-turkeys-twitter-block-
wrong-cb596ce5f27, (accessed November 27, 2016). 
13 S. Ocak, ‘“Siber Suçlar” için resmi adım atıldı: SOME’ler 
geliyor’ Radikal, June 20, 2013. http://www.radikal.com.
tr/turkiye/siber_suclar_icin_resim_adim_atildi_someler_
geliyor-1138417, (accessed November 27, 2016). ‘Police is 
`Working on’ Twitter, Interior Minister Says’ Bianet, June 
17, 2013. http://bianet.org/english/politics/147681-police-
Approximately six months after the Gezi protests, 
a massive corruption scandal broke out in December 
2013 triggering the construction of a sprawling 
online control regime. The scandal mostly transpired 
on social media with Erdogan’s opponents sharing 
transcripts and audio files of illegally wiretapped 
conversations between Erdogan, his son, cabinet 
ministers and pro-AKP businessmen. To curb 
the flow of damning information online, the AKP 
began to deploy a combination of first, second and 
third generation controls by introducing stricter 
legislation, banning Twitter and YouTube, surveilling 
and prosecuting users, and throttling social media 
platforms. 
The AKP government’s approach to ICTs during 
this period bears striking similarities to that of the 
Russian government in the aftermath of the 2011-
12 protest movement, also known as the White 
Revolution. Having noticed the “opportunities for 
political engagement and mobilization afforded by 
social media,” the Russian government engaged 
in a widespread crackdown. It introduced laws to 
limit political engagement online, “attempted to 
re-create the state through cyberspace, fostering 
self-censorship and disempowering publics,” and 
increased the presence of pro-government forces 
online creating “distorted communication within the 
Russian public sphere.”14 
In what follows, we examine similar strategies of 
control that took place in the Turkish online sphere 
between 2013 and 2016. 
1. Legislation
Shortly after the corruption scandal, the AKP-
dominated Parliament passed a new law amending 
the provisions of the 2007 Internet Law. The new law 
authorized the TIB to issue a blocking order based 
on a complaint filed for breach of an individual’s 
right to privacy and to do so without obtaining a 
court order. Per the new law, individuals and legal 
entities can directly apply to the TIB and request 
the removal of offending content. The TIB can then 
require the ISPs to remove the offending content 
is-working-on-twitter-interior-minister-says, (accessed 
November 27, 2016). 
14  A. Klyueva, “Taming Online Political Engagement in 
Russia: Disempowered Publics, Empowered State, and 
Challenges of the Fully Functioning Society.” International 
Journal of Communication, 2016, 4670. 
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within 4 hours. The new law also enables a URL-
based blocking system, making it possible to block 
individual posts or all posts from a specific social 
media user.15 If the offending website is hosted 
domestically, it can be taken down by the TIB; if it is 
hosted abroad, then the said content can be blocked 
and filtered through ISPs.16 The new law even gave 
the president of the TIB the authority to block URLs 
without complaints having been filed at all. Another 
controversial provision required the ISPs to collect 
data on users’ activities for up to two years and to 
provide authorities with this data on demand.17
In addition to passing a stricter Internet Law, the 
AKP amended the Law on State Intelligence Services 
and the National Intelligence Organization (Law No. 
6532) to expand the surveillance of online users. 
The amendment gives the National Intelligence 
Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, known 
by its Turkish acronym, MIT) unfettered access 
to online and offline “information, documents, 
data, or records from public institutions, financial 
institutions, and entities with or without a legal 
character.” In practice, the new law enables the MIT 
to obtain citizens’ personal data from any public 
or private institution (banks, schools, hospitals, 
ISPs) without a court order. Moreover, the new law 
criminalizes “the leaking and publication of secret 
official information, punishable by a prison term 
of up to nine years” and gives the AKP yet another 
tool to prevent the press and online news sites from 
reporting on government corruption and official 
misconduct.18
15 Since the blocking of a specific URL on encrypted 
communications (e.g. websites that start with “HTTPS”) is 
technically not possible without banning the whole domain 
name, the amendment included a specific provision that 
enabled the ISPs to block websites in their entirety. See: E.K. 
Sözeri, ‘Ban against a single blog post leads Turkish ISPs to 
censor all of WordPress’, The Daily Dot, April 1, 2015 http://www.
dailydot.com/layer8/turkey-wordpress-censorship-block/, 
(accessed November 27, 2016).
16 Freedom House, Struggle for Turkey’s Internet, August 
27, 2014, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/
The%20Struggle%20for%20Turkey%27s%20Internet.pdf, 
(accessed November 27, 2016).
17 W. Zeldin, ‘Turkey: Law on Internet Publications 
Amended’, Library of Congress, February 24, 2014. 
Retrieved from https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/
article/turkey-law-on-internet-publications-amended/, 
(accessed November 27, 2016).
18 K. Roth, ‘Turkey’s Tyrant in the Making’, Foreign Policy, 
May12, 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/12/
2. Social media bans 
To control online flows of information, the 
AKP has also resorted to banning social media 
platforms. Whereas the earlier bans in late 2000s 
were prompted by content that allegedly threatened 
national unity, family and moral values, etc., those 
that have taken place since 2014 are part and 
parcel of the AKP’s broader initiatives to curb the 
dissemination of news and information about the 
corruption scandal, foreign policy failures, Kurdish 
issue and/or security crises. For example, the TIB 
blocked access to Twitter in March 2014 citing a 
court order based on privacy invasion complaints 
that had been filed by citizens, however the ban 
was actually motivated by the AKP’s need to limit 
the dissemination of critical news and information 
ahead of the local elections.  19 A month later, an 
Istanbul court asked Twitter, YouTube and Facebook 
to remove the images of a prosecutor being held at 
gunpoint arguing that these images were helping to 
“spread terrorist propaganda.” Facebook complied 
with the court decision, removed the said images 
before the deadline and averted the ban. Twitter 
and YouTube remained unavailable for several 
hours, but they too complied and removed the 
images afterwards.20 
3. Content removal 
Since 2013, the AKP government has banned 
social media sites promptly and without hesitation. 
Yet even in the absence of specific incidents, it 
pursues tight control over the flow of information 
by filing content removal requests with social media 
companies on a regular basis. As can be seen in 
transparency reports issued by Facebook, Google 
and Twitter, Turkey ranks among the top countries 
with the most removal requests.21 
turkeys-tyrant-in-the-making/, (accessed November 27, 
2016); Freedom House, op. cit. 
19 Z. Tufekci, op. cit.
20 E. Peker and S. Schechner, ‘Turkey Briefly Blocks 
YouTube’, Wall Street Journal, April 6, 2015, http://www.
wsj.com/articles/turkish-court-bans-access-to-internet-
sites-over-hostage-crisis-content-1428325451, (accessed 
November 27, 2016). 
21 Google, Transparency Report: Turkey, https://www.
google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/
TR/, (accessed November 27, 2016). Facebook, 
Government Requests Report: Turkey, https://govtrequests.
facebook.com/country/Turkey/2015-H2/, (accessed 
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Table 2: Number of content removal requests by 
Turkish courts or administrative entities
Year Google Facebook Twitter
2010 100 - -
2011 443 - -
2012 12,122 - 16
2013 13,965 2,014 32
2014 3,533 5,517 2,946
2015 4,366 6,574 10,070
2016 - - 14,953
An important point to note here is the inclination 
of these companies to comply with Turkish 
authorities’ requests to avoid a total ban, loss of 
users and advertising revenues in Turkey’s ever-
growing digital market. For example, since March 
2014 Twitter has used its “country-withheld content 
policy” tool to block certain users or tweets from 
being seen in Turkey.22 Facebook has repeatedly shut 
down pages of Kurdish politicians and newspapers, 
general interest pages about Kurdish music and 
culture, and pages with pro-Kurdish content simply 
based on “community complaints.”23 According to 
a leaked internal guideline, Facebook prompts its 
editors to block any content that allegedly insults 
Ataturk or supports the Kurdish militia group PKK.24
Internet and free speech activists in Turkey 
describe Twitter’s policy as hypocritical considering 
its position on global free speech.25 Yaman Akdeniz, a 
November 27, 2016). Twitter, Transparency Report: Turkey, 
https://transparency.twitter.com/en/countries/tr.html, 
(accessed November 27, 2016). Note that Facebook does 
not provide number of requests, and that Twitter’s 2016 
data only covers the first half of the year. 
22 V. Gadde, ‘Challenging the access ban in Turkey’, 
Twitter, March 26, 2014, https://blog.twitter.com/2014/
challenging-the-access-ban-in-turkey, (accessed 
November 27, 2016). 
23 Freedom House, Struggle for Turkey’s Internet, August 
27, 2014, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/
The%20Struggle%20for%20Turkey%27s%20Internet.pdf, 
(accessed November 27, 2016).
24  S. Spary, ‘Facebook Is Embroiled in a Row with Activists 
Over “Censorship”’, BuzzFeed, April 8, 2016, https://www.
buzzfeed.com/saraspary/facebook-in-dispute-with-pro-
kurdish-activists-over-deleted (accessed November 27, 
2016).
25  E.K. Sözeri, ‘Uncovering the accounts that trigger 
Turkey’s war on Twitter’, The Daily Dot, January 31, 2015, 
prominent activist and legal scholar notes that since 
most content that is readily removed by Facebook 
and Twitter is specifically about political expression, 
the already-existing fears among dissidents, 
activists and journalists are worsened .26 According 
to members of Turkey Blocks, an independent 
group that identifies and verifies reports of internet 
censorship, also note that Twitter, Facebook and 
Google are “on board” with Turkey’s censorship 
practices because they collaborate with the 
authorities and hold Turkey to different standards 
in terms of content removal requests. They note 
that “Especially in the post-coup period, Twitter 
readily complies with Turkey’s demands” which has 
“emboldened” Turkish authorities.27   
Other enablers of government restrictions are 
the domestic ISPs. In 2008, upon TIB’s request, 
the  ISPs agreed to install DNS servers that sync 
directly with TIB’s central server facilitating the 
automatic updating of list of websites to be banned 
under “catalog crimes” (such as child pornography 
or obscenity). 28  In 2014, the TIB expanded this 
infrastructure by introducing deep packet inspection 
(DPI) technologies and had the ISPs agree to maintain 
detailed traffic logs of their customers. The use of DPI 
also enabled the TIB and by proxy the government, 
to use more opaque tools to censor online content, 
such as blocking individual URL addresses instead 
of banning the entire domain, wholesale banning of 
news topics instead of banning news websites, and 
throttling access to social media platforms instead 
of nationwide bans.
http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/twitter-transparency-
report-turkey-censorship/, (accessed November 27, 
2016). J. Halliday, ‘Twitter’s Tony Wang: “We are the free 
speech wing of the free speech party”’, The Guardian, 
March 22, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/
media/2012/mar/22/twitter-tony-wang-free-speech 
(accessed November 27, 2016). 
26 Email correspondence with Yaman Akdeniz, 2016. 
27 Skype interview with two members of Turkey Blocks, 
January 2, 2017. 
28 E.K. Sözeri, ‘Censorship reveals direct, likely illegal link 
between ISPs and Turkey’s government’, The Daily Dot, 
December 28, 2016, http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/
turkey-censorship-nos-court-orders-illegal/, (accessed 
January 14, 2017), M. Akgül and M. Kırlıdoğ, op cit.
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4. Surveillance of users  
In addition to first and second generation 
controls, Turkish authorities have begun to deploy 
third generation controls, such as surveillance and 
hacking. For example, the Turkish National Police 
used online intrusion tools and services provided 
by Hacking Team, an Italian surveillance company, 
between 2011 and 2014.29 Turk Telekom—the 
largest ISP that owns 80% of internet infrastructure 
in Turkey – has also been found to have procured 
deep packet inspection tools from Procera Networks, 
a U.S.-based company. 30 Turk Telekom also used to 
work with Phorm, a targeted advertising company, 
and deployed its deep packet inspection tools in 
violation of privacy laws.31 Additionally, there are 
other unspecified government clients that have 
used (and/or continue to use) mass surveillance 
services provided by Asoto, Netclean and Nokia 
Siemens Networks.32
5. Prosecution of users 
An important tool in the Turkish government’s 
arsenal to suppress critical online speech is the 
prosecution of social media users based on their 
posts that allegedly insult the state and state 
29 E.K. Sözeri, ‘Turkey paid Hacking Team $600k to spy on 
civilians,’ The Daily Dot, July 7, 2015, http://www.dailydot.
com/politics/hacking-team-turkey/, (accessed November 
27, 2016).
30 It was in July 2014 when Turk Telekom’s contract with 
Procera Networks was revealed. However, Procera 
released a statement noting that its activities were in 
accordance with the new Internet Law and the specific 
provision that required ISPs to store users’ activity logs 
for two years. See W. Zeldin, op. cit., T. Fox-Brewster, 
‘Is An American Company’s Technology Helping Turkey 
Spy On Its Citizens?’, Forbes, October 25, 2016, http://
www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2016/10/25/
procera-francisco-partners-turkey-surveillance-erdogan/, 
(accessed November 27, 2016). S. Güçlü, ‘Türk Telekom’a 
5 Yıl Önce Verilen Fiber Muafiyet Hakkı İşe Yaradı mı?’, 
Türk İnternet, November 7, 2016, http://www.turk-
internet.com/portal/yazigoster.php?yaziid=54478, 
(accessed November 27, 2016).
31 E.K. Sözeri, ‘Turkish government revealed to be spying 
on its citizens through ISPs’, The Daily Dot, October 29, 
2016, www.dailydot.com/layer8/turkey-procera-deal-isps-
dpi/, (accessed November 27, 2016). 
32 Privacy International, Surveillance Industry Index, https://
sii.transparencytoolkit.org/search?action=index&contr
oller=docs&found_in_facet=Turkey&page=1, (accessed 
November 27, 2016). 
officials and disseminate propaganda for terrorist 
organizations. According to the Penal Code, 
insulting state officials is punishable by a prison 
sentence of one or two years, whereas insulting 
the president (i.e. Erdogan) can lead to a prison 
sentence of up to four years (Article 125/3a and 
Article 299).33 The Ministry of Justice statistics show 
that 1,953 individuals were prosecuted in 2015 on 
charges of insulting Erdogan, and 49 on charges of 
insulting state officials.34 According to news reports, 
34 of these cases involved social media posts by 
members of opposition parties, lawyers, academics, 
journalists, and members of NGOs.35 Four users 
were handed 10-month prison sentences each; 
three placed under judicial control, and fourteen 
arrested pending trial. The rest were detained 
pending prosecution or summoned for questioning. 
Among the high-profile cases are an anchorwoman, 
a former editor-in-chief, and a columnist who were 
prosecuted for allegedly critical tweets concerning 
Erdogan, the state or state officials. 36 
In addition, state institutions and private 
companies have begun to take legal action against 
33 Venice Commission, Council of Europe, Penal Code 
of Turkey (Law 5237, September 26, 2004), Opinion No. 
831/2015, February 15, 2016. http://www.venice.coe.
int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-REF(2016)011-e, 
(accessed November 27, 2016). 
34 Turkish Ministry of Justice, Ceza Mahkemelerinde 
TCK Uyarınca Yıl İçinde Açılan Davalardaki Suç ve Sanık 
Sayıları (2015) (Distribution of court cases by Penal 
Code articles (2015), http://www.adlisicil.adalet.gov.tr/
Istatistikler/1996/genel_tck_açılan2015.pdf, (accessed 
November 27, 2016). 
35 B. Molu and D. Irak, ‘TCK md. 299 - Cumhurbaşkanına 
Hakaret Suçu kapsamında ifadeye çağrılan, gözaltına 
alınan, soruşturma açılan, tutuklanan kişilerin güncel 
listesi’, April 7, 2016, http://bit.ly/tck_299, (accessed 
November 27, 2016). 
36 Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘Turkish editor given 
suspended prison term for insulting Erdoğan on Twitter’, 
June 19, 2015, https://cpj.org/2015/06/turkish-editor-
given-suspended-prison-term-for-in.php, (accessed 
November 27, 2016). E.K. Sözeri, ‘Dutch journalist 
arrested in Turkey for ‘insulting’ President Erdoğan 
online’, The Daily Dot, Apr 26, 2016, http://www.dailydot.
com/layer8/ebru-umar-insult-erdogan-twitter/, (accessed 
November 27, 2016). ‘Turkish court acquits journalist 
over corruption case tweet’, AFP, October 6, 2015, https://
uk.news.yahoo.com/turkish-court-acquits-journalist-
over-corruption-case-tweet-093039669.html, (accessed 
November 27, 2016).
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social media users, exploiting Turkey’s vaguely-
defined defamation laws. In 2015, the state-run 
news agency, Anadolu Ajansı, sued more than fifty 
artists and journalists on charges of libel.37 In 2016, 
Turkcell, one of Turkey’s largest mobile network 
providers, sought 10,000 Turkish liras (USD 3,500) 
in damages from each Twitter user that tweeted 
the hashtag #TecavuzCell (“Rape Cell”) as a means 
of protesting the company’s sponsorship of a 
government-linked foundation embroiled in child 
abuse allegations.38
In addition to defamation charges, in 2015 
Turkish authorities have accused more than 
13,000 individuals with “disseminating terrorist 
propaganda” in relation to expression of political 
opinions or coverage of the Kurdish conflict.39 
That same year, 36 journalists and newspaper 
distributors were imprisoned on charges of terrorist 
propaganda.40 Although official statements did not 
specify how many of these cases involve social media 
posts, 41 news reports stated that Kurdish journalists 
37 E. Önderoğlu, ‘Erdoğan’ı Eleştiren Kendini Mahkemede 
Buluyor; İşte Davalar!’, Bianet, April 30, 2015, https://
bianet.org/bianet/medya/164185-erdogan-i-elestiren-
kendini-mahkemede-buluyor-iste-davalar, (accessed 
November 27, 2016). 
38 E.K. Sözeri, ‘A Turkish mobile provider got 13 court 
orders to erase this hashtag from the Internet’, The 
Daily Dot, May 20, 2016, http://www.dailydot.com/
layer8/turkcell-tecavucell-twitter-censorship/, (accessed 
November 27, 2016). 
39 The Anti-Terror Law stipulates that “any person making 
propaganda for a terrorist organization [by justifying, 
glorifying or inciting violent or threatening acts] shall be 
punished with imprisonment from one to five years. If 
this crime is committed through means of mass media, 
the penalty shall be aggravated by one half.” (Article 7). 
Legislationline, Law on Fight Against Terrorism (Law 3713, 
April 12, 1991), http://www.legislationline.org/download/
action/download/id/3727/file/Turkey_anti_terr_1991_
am2010_en.pdf, (accessed November 27, 2016), Turkish 
Ministry of Justice, Ceza Mahkemelerinde Özel Kanunlar 
Uyarinca Yıl İçinde Açilan Davalardaki Suç Ve Sanik Sayiları 
(2015) (“Distribution of court cases by Special Codes 
articles (2015)”), 2015, http://www.adlisicil.adalet.gov.tr/
Istatistikler/1996/genel_%C3%B6zel_a%C3%A7%C4%B1la
n2015.pdf, (accessed November 27, 2016).
40 E. Önderoğlu, ‘2015 Medya: Gazetecilik Tehlikeli 
ve Sakıncalı Bir Meslek!’, Bianet, January 29, 2016, 
https://bianet.org/bianet/medya/171582-2015-medya-
gazetecilik-tehlikeli-ve-sakincali-bir-meslek, (accessed 
November 27, 2016). 
41 During the pre-coup period, Turkish officials refrained 
Idris Yılmaz and Vildan Atmaca were prosecuted 
for their pro-PKK Facebook pages, while Hayri Tunc 
was held in pre-trial detention for his Twitter and 
Facebook posts, and Hamza Aktan was detained for 
retweeting a BBC post regarding military operations 
in Southeast Turkey. 42 
6. Throttling and DNS poisoning 
During the 2013-2016 period, the AKP government 
began to use new tools to limit the flow of news 
and information in the online public sphere. The 
first is bandwidth throttling, the intentional slowing 
down of internet service at the ISP level. According 
to Turkey Blocks, there have been at least seven 
cases of throttling since 2015.43 As seen in the table 
below, the AKP government blocked URLs (including 
news sites) and throttled social media platforms at 
times of major political events and security crises to 
suppress critical reporting and to prevent citizens 
from mobilizing.44  
from openly referring to social media posts as evidence 
of “terrorist propaganda.” In the post-coup period, 
however, officials have made explicit references to social 
media posts and stated that these posts can potentially 
be used as evidence in investigations. 
42 Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘Turkish journalist 
arrested for posts on social media’, February 8, 2016, 
https://cpj.org/2016/02/turkish-journalist-arrested-
for-posts-on-social-me.php, (accessed November 27, 
2016), Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘In Turkey, two 
journalists accused of creating terrorist propaganda 
with social media posts’, November 18, 2015, https://
cpj.org/2015/11/in-turkey-two-journalists-accused-
of-terrorism-ove.php, (accessed November 27, 2016), 
‘Turkey detains pro-Kurdish news editor over tweets’, 
AFP, April 30, 2016, https://www.yahoo.com/news/turkey-
detains-pro-kurdish-news-editor-over-tweets-002818986.
html, (accessed November 27, 2016).
43 I. Mater, ‘TIB’siz Türkiye’, Bianet, August 27, 2016, 
http://bianet.org/biamag/biamag/177985-tib-siz-turkiye, 
(accessed November 27, 2016). 
44 This table is based on information presented in 
Freedom House’s “2016 Freedom of the Net: Turkey” and 
Turkey Blocks reports. Note that on July 15, 2016, the 
night of the coup attempt, social media was throttled as 
is generally the case, however this decision was promptly 
overturned in order to disseminate President Erdoğan’s 
call to his supporters to take to the streets and resist the 
putschist soldiers. See: E.K. Sözeri, ‘Why Turkey issued a 
social media ban during a coup attempt—and promptly 
lifted it’, The Daily Dot, July 17, 2016, www.dailydot.com/
layer8/turkey-coup-social-media-ban-lift/ (accessed 
November 27, 2016).
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Table 3: Types of content restrictions imposed by the Turkish government in the pre-coup period
Date Incident Content restriction
April 3, 2015 Istanbul prosecutor taken hostage 166 URLs blocked including news articles, and 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube content
July 20, 2015 Bomb attack in Suruç 173 URLs blocked including 38 news websites 
October 10, 2015 Bomb attack in Ankara Facebook and Twitter throttled 
January 12, 2016 Bomb attack in Istanbul Government issued media blackout
February 17, 2016 Bomb attack in Ankara Facebook and Twitter throttled
March 13, 2016 Bomb attack in Ankara Facebook and Twitter throttled, 214 URLs 
blocked
March 19, 2016 Bomb attack in Istanbul Facebook and Twitter banned for 24 hours
June 28, 2016 Bomb attack at Istanbul airport Facebook and Twitter throttled
July 15, 2016 Military coup attempt Facebook and Twitter briefly throttled
The second tool deployed by Turkish authorities 
is DNS poisoning, a form of hacking or blocking 
social media sites by surreptitiously redirecting 
users to incorrect IP addresses. In March 2014, Turk 
Telekom hijacked Google DNS servers, which the 
Internet Society described as a “man-in-the-middle” 
(MiTM) attack” performed to “comply with [the] 
government’s banning of [Twitter and YouTube]” 
by “giving users false information.”45 Not only were 
users blocked from their intended destination, but 
also the “IP addresses of [their] devices attempting 
to reach the two services using foreign DNS servers” 
were also logged by the government.46 
45 D. York, ‘Turkish Hijacking of DNS Providers Shows 
Clear Need For Deploying BGP And DNS Security’, 
Internet Society, April 1, 2014, http://www.internetsociety.
org/deploy360/blog/2014/04/turkish-hijacking-of-dns-
providers-shows-clear-need-for-deploying-bgp-and-dns-
security/, (accessed November 27, 2016). 
46 S. Gallagher, ‘Turkey now blocking social media by 
hijacking Google DNS’, Ars Technica, March 30, 2014, 
http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/03/
turkey-now-blocking-social-media-by-hijacking-google-
dns/, (accessed November 27, 2016).
IV. July 2016-present: Post-coup 
developments
As shown above, the AKP constructed a sprawling 
surveillance-control-censorship regime during 
2013-2016 mainly in response to the political fallout 
from Gezi protests and the corruption scandal as 
well as security-related incidents such as terrorist 
attacks. In the aftermath of the failed coup, the 
AKP’s internet policy was similarly shaped by 
political anxieties which ultimately expanded and 
fortified the existing online control regime. 
In the immediate aftermath of the failed coup, 
the AKP government under the leadership of 
President Erdogan declared a State of Emergency, 
and embarked on a massive purge of security 
officers, civil servants, educational and media 
workers it accused of being affiliated with the 
religious movement of Fethullah Gulen— the alleged 
mastermind of the coup. Given the severity of the 
potential threats the coup would have caused had it 
succeeded, a “national consensus” emerged, uniting 
the AKP, opposition parties and various political 
actors and engendering the (false) belief that the 
State of Emergency would be used only to root out 
the coup planners. However, it soon became clear 
that Erdogan and his government would deploy the 
SoE to repress other perceived enemies, especially 
the Kurds, to consolidate their hegemony and stifle 
any remaining opposition—both online and offline. 
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In what follows, we focus on measures taken by the 
AKP in the post-coup period and their implications 
on online communications.  
 1. Legislation via decree laws 
One of the unchecked powers granted by the 
State of Emergency is the ability to rule by decree. 
Since the coup attempt in July 2016, the AKP 
government passed fifteen decree laws (as of this 
writing) that enabled the reconfiguration of political, 
economic, social and cultural fields as per Erdogan’s 
political priorities. Including, but not limited to the 
massive purge of tens of thousands of civil servants 
without due process, closure of hundreds of print 
and broadcast outlets, arrests of journalists, writers 
and members of the parliament, decree laws have 
also been deployed to impose further restrictions 
on the rapidly-deteriorating digital public sphere. 
The passing and application of decree laws are 
supposedly limited to coup-related matters, however 
in practice they have resulted in digital surveillance 
of users and the shutting down of internet service 
at times of so-called security operations (see 
below). For example, Decree Law 670 enables the 
interception of digital communications of all users 
as part of the coup-related investigations and the 
collection of private data from all state institutions 
and private companies. Decree Law 671 amends 
the Law of Digital Communications and allows 
the BTK to overtake any privately-held digital 
communications company including cable or cellular 
network providers to “[maintain] national security 
and public order; prevent crime; protect public 
health and public morals; or protect the rights and 
freedoms [of citizens].”47 Last but not least, and in 
a blow to personal privacy online, Decree Law 680 
amends the Code of Police Conduct and enables the 
Department of Cybercrimes to gather and intercept 
internet traffic on any cyber-related investigation, 
and to obtain personal information from ISPs 
without a court order.
47 E.K. Sözeri, ‘Turkey uses emergency decree to shut 
down internet on 11 Kurdish cities to “prevent protests”’, 
The Daily Dot, October 27, 2016, http://www.dailydot.
com/layer8/turkey-cuts-kurdistan-internet/, (accessed 
November 27, 2016).
2. Closing of the TIB 
One of the significant developments in the 
aftermath of the coup attempt was the closing of the 
TIB by decree law. Claiming that the agency had been 
infiltrated by Gulenists and served as a hub of illegal 
wiretapping over the years, the AKP government 
transferred the TIB’s duties and responsibilities 
to the BTK. However, the closing of the agency 
responsible for the blocking of more than 100,000 
websites and banning of social media platforms 
on various occasions is not necessarily good 
news for internet users, activists and digital rights 
lawyers in the country. As Yaman Akdeniz notes, 
the BTK is driven by the same “aggressive blocking 
mentality” as the TIB was. Akdeniz also underlines 
the partisan character of the BTK since it operates 
under the Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs 
and Communications, and its staff are government 
appointees.48
3. Throttling
In the post-coup period, the AKP government 
has continued to use throttling as a measure to 
restrict certain types of content. As table 4 shows, 
social media platforms and on certain occasions 
private messaging applications are throttled to limit 
online communications in the aftermath of terrorist 
attacks, security and military-related incidents. 
4. Internet Shutdowns and Cloud/VPN Restrictions
During the post-coup period, the AKP not only 
escalated the implementation of its customary 
strategies (i.e implementation of legal restrictions, 
throttling, prosecution of online users), but also 
deployed internet shutdowns, cloud and VPN 
restrictions—drastic forms of control that are 
generally associated with dictatorships.
First came the internet shutdown in September 
2016 as elected mayors in predominantly-Kurdish 
cities were physically removed from their posts 
48 ‘Social media blocked in Turkey’, Turkey Blocks, August 
25, 2016, https://turkeyblocks.org/2016/08/25/social-
media-blocked-turkey/, (accessed November 27, 2016). 
‘Elektronik Haberleşme Sektörüne İlişkin Yetkilendirme 
Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik’, 
(“Amendment to the Authorization Regulation in the 
Digital Communications Sector”) Resmi Gazete, http://
www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/06/20160611-1.
htm, (accessed November 27, 2016). 
  TURKEY’S INTERNET POLICY AFTER THE COUP ATTEMPT                                                                                                                               FEBRUARY 2017  
Page 14
Table 4: Types of content restrictions imposed by the Turkish government in the post-coup period
Date Incident Content restriction
August 20, 2016 Bomb attack in Gaziantep Facebook and Twitter throttled for six hours
August 25, 2016 Unknown reason Facebook, Twitter and YouTube throttled for seven 
hours
September 11, 2016 28 elected mayors removed 
from office in the Kurdish-
majority Southeast
Landline and mobile internet access cut for 15 cities, 
for approximately 12 million citizens
October 7, 2016 Unknown reason Twitter intermittently throttled
October 8, 2016 Email archive of Energy 
 Minister leaked
Google Drive, Drobox, One Drive and GitHub blocked 
October 26-31, 2016 Co-mayors of Diyarbakir 
(Kurdish-majority city) 
 detained
Landline and mobile internet access intermittently cut 
for 11 cities in southeast region 
November 4, 2016 Pro-Kurdish party (HDP) 
 co-chairs and deputies 
 detained
Twitter, YouTube, Facebook and WhatsApp throttled
November 4, 2016 Unknown reason Access to popular VPN services banned permanently
December 3, 2016 Unknown reason Wikipedia temporarily throttled
December 18, 2016 Unknown reason Access to Tor Network banned permanently
December 19, 2016 Assassination of Russian 
Ambassador to Turkey
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube throttled; Dutch 
 broadcaster NOS banned
December 22, 2016 Release of ISIS video on 
 Turkish soldiers’ execution
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube throttled
January 1,2017 Armed attack at Istanbul 
nightclub
Temporary gag order including social media and news 
websites (no throttling)
under the State of Emergency rulings. The AKP 
government via the BTK shut down internet service 
in ten cities to suppress the dissemination of news 
and information regarding possible civil unrest in 
the region. According to Turkey Blocks, internet 
access through landline and mobile telephony 
was unavailable for about 4-6 hours, affecting 
approximately 12 million people. This very first 
internet shutdown, albeit regional, was repeated 
in October 2016 when the co-mayors of Diyarbakir, 
the de facto capital of the Kurdish community, 
were arrested on charges of terrorism. This second 
shutdown affected approximately six million people 
in 11 cities in the southeast, and lasted two days (in 
Diyarbakir, the duration was five days).49 As Rebecca 
49 ‘New internet shutdown in Turkey’s Southeast: 
8% of country now offline amidst Diyarbakir unrest’, 
Turkey Blocks, October 27, 2016, https://turkeyblocks.
org/2016/10/27/new-internet-shutdown-turkey-
southeast-offline-diyarbakir-unrest/, (accessed 
MacKinnon notes “localized disconnection and 
restriction” is a tool used by governments to “ensure 
that people cannot use the internet or mobile 
phones to organize protests” in times of crisis.50
On November 4, the crackdown on Kurdish 
politicians, as 11 members of the parliament from 
the Peoples’ Democratic Party (known by its Turkish 
acronym, HDP) were arrested in midnight house 
raids. Instead of a regional internet shutdown, the 
government implemented a nationwide throttling of 
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, as well as WhatsApp (the 
first time an instant messaging service was restricted) 
justifying it as a “temporary security measure.”51 The 
November 27, 2016). 
50 R. MacKinnon, 2011. “China’s ‘Networked 
Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, 22:2, p. 40
51 ‘Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and WhatsApp shutdown 
in Turkey’, Turkey Blocks, November 4, 2016, https://
turkeyblocks.org/2016/11/04/social-media-shutdown-
turkey/, (accessed November 27, 2016).  ‘Slowdown in 
Page 15
FEBRUARY 2017                                                                                                                       TURKEY’S INTERNET POLICY AFTER THE COUP ATTEMPT
throttling of social media and instant messaging 
services was indeed temporary, however the BTK 
ordered Turkish ISPs to block popular VPN services 
and Tor Network to enable the full implementation 
of throttling and banning orders.52 Experts note that 
the decision to block Tor access will most likely be 
permanent as part of the government’s broader 
plan to not only execute censorship orders but also 
to enable easier surveillance of users.53
Considering the above-mentioned developments, 
it is fair to argue that the Turkish government’s 
post-coup internet policy is different from the pre-
coup period in terms of both the types of measures 
(e.g. regional internet shutdowns) and the types of 
incidents that trigger these measures. For example, 
the blocking of online communications that occurred 
in July 2015 was prompted by a cross-border military 
operation in Southeast Turkey,54 whereas those in 
September-November 2016 were specifically aimed 
at limiting (potential) civilian protests in the same 
region. Likewise, social media throttling in the pre-
coup period transpired at times of security-related 
incidents (see Table 3), whereas in the post-coup 
period it was prompted by the leaking of damaging 
emails and information, and was complemented 
with the blocking of cloud drive services, VPN 
services and Tor access. This widening of the net 
access to social media in Turkey a ‘security measure,’ 
says PM’, Hurriyet Daily News, November 4, 2016, http://
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/problems-in-access-to-
social-media-in-turkey-a-security-measure-says-pm.asp
x?pageID=238&nID=105744&NewsCatID=509, (accessed 
November 27, 2016).
52 L. Franceschi-Bicchierai, ‘Turkey Doubles Down on 
Censorship With Block on VPNs, Tor’, Motherboard, 
November 4, 2016, https://motherboard.vice.com/read/
turkey-doubles-down-on-censorship-with-block-on-vpns-
tor, (accessed November 27, 2016).
53 J. Kopstein, ‘Tor Ban in Turkey Likely Permanent, 
Watchdog Group Says’, Vocativ, January 03, 2017 www.
vocativ.com/389232/tor-ban-turkey-permanent/, 
(accessed January 14, 2017).
54 In July 2015, mobile internet access was cut in most 
of southeast Turkey for 60 hours during the aerial 
bombardment of ISIS and PKK positions in Northern 
Syria and Iraq. According to local news reports, the 
service interruption was based on an order issued by 
the Office of the Prime Minister. See, E.K. Sözeri, ‘Turkey 
cuts internet access to Kurdish towns, removes elected 
mayors’, The Daily Dot, September 11, 2016, www.
dailydot.com/layer8/turkey-internet-access-kurdish-
towns/ (accessed January 14, 2017).
and tightening of the mesh, so to speak, occurred in 
October 2016 when the government blocked access 
to drive services (Google Drive, DropBox, Microsoft 
One Drive) and the software repository GitHub 
in response to the leaking of the email archive of 
Berak Albayrak, the Minister of Energy and Natural 
Sources, and Erdogan’s son-in-law. The decision to 
block said services was prompted by the publication 
of 57,000 emails that laid bare the relationships 
between the AKP, and business and media circles, as 
well as details about Albayrak’s private life. 55 
5. Internet sovereignty and data localization 
initiatives
Another step Turkish authorities have taken in 
the post-coup period is the building of “a domestic 
search engine and email service compatible 
with national culture and values.” Similar to Russian, 
Chinese and Iranian efforts at creating digital 
borders and launching country-specific social media 
platforms (China’s WeChat and Russia’s VKontakte),56 
the key objective of internet sovereignty is to 
control the flow of information that emanates 
from outside Turkey. In addition to online traffic 
control, Turkish authorities are also motivated by 
enhanced surveillance of online communications, 
as seen in the official statement pointing to the 
“need to store user data within Turkey’s borders and 
ensure that communications could be fully analyzed 
domestically.”57 
To incentivize the establishment of local data 
centers, the government will provide favorable 
terms in regard to land use, corporate taxes and 
electricity costs. According to Decree Law No. 678, 
published in the official gazette in November 2016, 
the government’s plan is to encourage Google, 
YouTube, Facebook and Twitter to establish data 
centers in Turkey and consequently make them 
55 ‘Turkey blocks web drives after email leak’, BBC, 
 October 10, www.bbc.com/news/technology-37608553, 
(accessed November 27, 2016).  
56 S. Gunitsky, 2015. “Corrupting the Cyber-Commons: 
Social Media as a Tool of Autocratic Stability,” Perspectives 
on Politics, 13:1, p. 44
57 ‘Turkey to launch domestic Google, Gmail replacements 
aligned with local culture and values’, Turkey Blocks, 
January 6, 2017, https://turkeyblocks.org/2017/01/06/
turkey-building-domestic-search-engine-and-email/, 
(accessed January 14, 2016).  
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subject to local laws. According to reports in pro-
government newspapers, data localization is part 
of a broader plan to store user data in order to 
“accelerate the process of identifying social media 
users that praise and provoke terrorism, closing 
their accounts, and blocking content.”58 As members 
of Turkey Blocks note, these initiatives signal a trend 
towards a “walled garden” model that denies access 
to foreign internet services and instead encourages 
local search engines and social media platforms, 
and is therefore isolationist in nature.59 
6. Prosecution of social media users and the 
institutionalization of “snitching” 
The prosecution of social media users is not a 
new phenomenon, however, in the post-coup period 
it has escalated both in terms of its pervasiveness 
and severity. According to the Ministry of Interior 
Affairs, 3,710 people were detained for questioning 
between July and December 2016 with 1,656 of them 
arrested, 1,970 released, and 84 under detention 
as of this writing. Charges included “inciting the 
public to hatred, animosity and agitation,” “praising 
terrorism,” “engaging in terrorist propaganda,” 
“insulting state officials” and “undermining state 
sovereignty and public safety.”60 In addition, as per 
the statement of a member of the parliamentary 
commission on security and intelligence affairs, 
the government purportedly set up a “Social Media 
Monitoring Unit” which  is currently in the process 
of preparing legal investigation notices for 17,000 
users and finding the addresses of another 45,000. 
61
58 B. Simsek, ‘Sosyal medya terorune kokten cozum 
geliyor, Sabah, January 4 2017, http://www.sabah.com.
tr/yasam/2017/01/04/sosyal-medya-terorune-kokten-
cozum-geliyor, (accessed January 14, 2016).  
59 Skype interview with two members of Turkey Blocks, 
January 2, 2017.
60 “Sosyal medyada buyuk gozalti,” Cumhuriyet, January 
18, 2017, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/
turkiye/650063/Sosyal_medyaya__buyuk_gozalti_..._10_
bin_kisiye_sorusturma_acildi.html, (accessed January 14, 
2016).  
61 ‘Sosyal medyaya buyuk operasyon,’ Cumhuriyet, 
January 14, 2017, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/
siyaset/660327/Sosyal_medyaya_buyuk_operasyon__17_
bin_kisi_hakkinda_fezleke_hazirlandi__45_bin_kullanici_
araniyor.html (accessed January 18, 2017)
Shortly after the release of this information, a high-
profile incident of social media-related prosecution 
occurred. Barbaros Sansal, fashion designer, LGBT 
activist and outspoken government critic became 
the target of pro-government trolls upon sharing 
a video message that included allegedly offensive 
remarks concerning the AKP, the Turkish state and 
society. Sansal was immediately extradited from 
Northern Cyprus to Turkey, only to be physically 
assaulted by angry mobs at the airport apron, and 
finally detained and arrested the next day.62
While online trolling played a role in bringing 
Sansal to the attention of law enforcement and the 
courts, there is no publicly available information as to 
how many of the above-mentioned detentions and 
arrests were initiated by police surveillance versus 
citizen informants. In a worrisome development, in 
December 2016 the Turkish National Police (TNP) 
launched a smart phone app and a dedicated 
webpage that allow citizens to report social media 
posts they consider to be terrorist propaganda. In its 
public announcements, the TNP has urged citizens 
to share all available information concerning the 
harmful content, the user, and to take a screen shot 
of the content in case it is deleted.63 The news of 
the app was welcomed by pro-government media 
outlets, journalists, pundits, and online users, who 
wholeheartedly encouraged fellow citizens to report 
the alleged “social media terrorists;” becoming a 
symbolizing indicator of the government’s changing 
internet policy and the ways it is implemented. 
62 E. Toksabay, ‘Turkish fashion designer arrested: 
reports’, Reuters, January 3, 2017, www.reuters.com/
article/us-turkey-security-designer-idUSKBN14N1PW, 
(accessed January 14, 2016).
63 ‘Sosyal medyada teröre destek verenler nasıl ihbar 
edilir?’, Yeni Safak, December 23, 2016, http://www.
yenisafak.com/teknoloji/sosyal-medyada-terore-destek-
verenler-nasil-ihbar-edilir-2585434, (accessed January 14, 
2016). 
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Figure 1: Message from Turkish National Police 
issued in July 2016: “Turkish National Police 
Warns Citizens: You can report social media 
profiles and pages that support terrorist activities 
and include criminal content by sending an 
email to the following accounts with links and 
screenshots.”64
Figure 2: Tweet posted by A Haber, a pro-
government television channel: “Report the 
terrorists to authorities by using your cellphone. 
New app from the police. ‘Online reporting’”65
64 T.C. Başbakanlık Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel 
Müdürlüğü (Republic of Turkey Office of the Prime 
Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information), 
‘Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü vatandaşları uyarıyor.’ @
Byegm on Twitter, July 17, 2016, https://twitter.com/
byegm/status/754682443458895872, (accessed January 
14, 2017).
65 ‘Teröristi cep telefonundan ihbar et!.. Emniyetten 
yeni uygulama “online ihbar” http://www.ahaber.com.
7. Pro-government presence online 
Previous sections have documented various 
types of online restrictions that range from throttling 
to prosecution of users. Although the majority of 
these restrictions are not formally acknowledged or 
announced, they are nonetheless based on official 
decisions made by the government and carried out 
by the BTK and the courts. However, as this section 
details, there has been a palpable increase in pro-
government presence online and consequently 
higher levels of intimidation and harassment against 
anti-AKP journalists, pundits and users. 
a) Trolls
In the immediate aftermath of the Gezi protests 
in 2013, the AKP government became aware of 
the protestors’ use of Twitter in mobilization and 
organization, and thus decided to form its own 
social media team. The initial objective of the 
6,000-member team, comprised of anonymous pro-
government influencers, was to promote a positive 
image of the government. However, this team soon 
came to be known as “AK Trolls” because their online 
activities turned abusive,  harassing and threatening 
critical journalists. 66 In 2015, their online affiliations 
with government officials and pro-government 
journalists were revealed, as were their attempts at 
organizing physical attacks targeting independent 
news organizations and journalists.67 
tr/webtv/teknoloji/teroristi-cep-telefonundan-ihbar-’, @
tvahaber on Twitter, December 18, 2016, https://twitter.
com/tvahaber/status/810479836217090048, (accessed 
January 14, 2017).
66 A. Albayrak & J. Parkinson, ‘Turkey’s Government Forms 
6,000-Member Social Media Team’, The Wall Street Journal, 
September 16, 2013, www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014
24127887323527004579079151479634742, (accessed 
January 14, 2017),  E. Kizilkaya, ‘AKP’s social media 
wars’, Al-Monitor, November 15, 2013, www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/originals/2013/11/akp-social-media-twitter-
facebook.html, (accessed January 14, 2017).
67 E.K. Sözeri, ‘Mapping Turkey’s Twitter-troll lynch mobs’, 
The Daily Dot, October 22, 2015, whttp://ww.dailydot.com/
layer8/turkey-twitter-trolls/, (accessed January 14, 2017), 
C. Yeginsu, ‘Opposition Journalists Under Assault in 
Turkey’, The New York Times, September 17, 2015, https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/world/europe/opposition-
journalists-in-turkey-increasingly-face-violent-attacks.
html, (accessed January 14, 2017),  E.K. Sözeri, ‘Dutch 
journalist arrested in Turkey for ‘insulting’ President 
Erdoğan online’, The Daily Dot, April 26, 2016, http://www.
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As documented by the International Press Institute 
(IPI), “government supporters and nationalists” were 
already using “threats of violence, verbal abuse, 
technical interference and legal threats” well before 
the coup attempt to either incite physical acts of 
violence against journalists or to simply “question 
their credibility or to silence them.” On Twitter, it 
was common practice for pro-AKP accounts to label 
journalists as “traitors”, “terrorists,” “supporters of 
terrorism” and “kafir” (infidel).68 The IPI notes that 
in the post-coup conjuncture, the Turkish National 
Police’s social media reporting program, coupled 
with the ongoing State of Emergency, has only 
strengthened government supporters’ harassment 
of journalists and granted them continuing 
impunity.69 
In addition to online harassment, the pro-AKP 
social media teams launched an online propaganda 
scheme aiming to boost the morale of young (male) 
Turks while intimidating Kurds in response to the 
flaring up of armed conflict between the Turkish 
dailydot.com/layer8/ebru-umar-insult-erdogan-twitter/, 
(accessed January 14, 2017).
68 IPI, 2017, “On the Line: Tracking Online Harassment 
of Journalists,” http://onthelinedb.ipi.media/, (accessed 
January 12, 2017).
69 IPI, op. cit. 
army and the PKK. Opening new accounts under 
pseudonyms such as “special force” and using the 
Turkish flag in their profile pictures, these pro-
government trolls shared images of dead bodies, 
purportedly of Kurdish militia, emblazoning them 
with nationalist slogans.70 It was later revealed that 
one such Twitter account was owned by none other 
than an AKP-affiliated governor in the region.71 By 
the time “anti-terror” operations concluded and 
the government declared that the region had been 
cleansed of terrorists, all such Twitter accounts were 
curiously shut down. 
To illustrate the pro-government presence online, 
we conducted an analysis of Twitter activity in the 
months before and after the coup attempt. Based 
on information collected by the DMI-TCAT,72 the 
following graphs show Twitter activity by different 
user groups. 
70 E.K. Sözeri, ‘The rotten politics infecting Turkey’s 
social media’, The Daily Dot, March 30, 2016, http://www.
dailydot.com/layer8/turkey-social-media-yeni-safak-
facebook-twitter-manipulation/, (accessed January 4, 
2017).  
71 ‘JÖH-PÖH hesabının altından Beytüşşebap kaymakamı 
çıktı’, Sendika.org, May 25, 2016, https://sendika14.
org/2016/05/joh-poh-hesabinin-altindan-beytussebap-
kaymakami-cikti/, (accessed January 14, 2017).
72 Digital Methods Initiative, Twitter Capture and Analysis 
Toolset. See: E. Borra & B. Rieder, ‘Programmed method: 
developing a toolset for capturing and analyzing tweets’, 
Aslib Journal of Information Management, 2014, Vol. 66 
Issue: 3, pp.262 – 278, http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/AJIM-09-
2013-0094, (accessed January 14, 2017).
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Graph 1: Pro-government accounts engaged in communication, propaganda campaigns
Graph 2: Pro-government trolls
Graph 3: Pro-government journalists
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Graph 5: Independent journalists
Graph 6: Foreign journalists based in Turkey
Graph 4: Human rights activists
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Graph 9: Random users
Graph 7: Gulen-affiliated journalists
Graph 8: Pro-HDP accounts
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As seen above, the coup attempt of July 15, 
2016 is certainly the most significant incident in the 
period we analyzed, prompting a strong reaction 
amongst almost all Turkey-based Twitter users, but 
especially pro-government trolls (Graph 2) and pro-
government journalists (Graph 3). The top-tweeted 
incidents by pro-government communication and 
propaganda accounts, on the other hand, include 
the ouster of Prime Minister Davutoglu (May 5, 
2016), PKK attacks (August 18, 2016), and the 
beginning of Turkish military operations in Syria 
(August 24, 2016) (Graph 1). This is because these 
accounts were carrying out communication and 
mobilization campaigns to garner popular support 
for Erdogan and his government’s policies regarding 
these political, security- and military-related 
developments. 
Pro-government trolls were most concerned with 
the coup attempt, Erdogan’s massive rally (on August 
8), PKK attacks, military operations in Syria, and the 
arrests of Kurdish deputies (in November) (Graph 2), 
whereas pro-government journalists tweeted most 
about the coup attempt and the arrests of Kurdish 
deputies (Graph 3). 
Due to Twitter’s limitations on data collection, 
the pre-coup period is under- represented for 
other groups analyzed for this research.  However, 
activities of other groups during the post-coup 
period nonetheless give us some insights into 
the events they tweeted about. Independent 
journalists, for example were interested in sharing 
information about various developments, but most 
importantly the coup attempt, PKK attacks, closure 
of independent media outlets, and crackdown on 
Kurdish politicians (Graph 5). Likewise, foreign 
journalists based in Turkey tweeted most about 
the coup attempt and arrests of Kurdish politicians 
(Graph 6). Human rights activists’ and pro-HDP 
accounts were most concerned with the arrests of 
Kurdish deputies (Graph 4). 
Another important insight provided by this 
analysis is the overwhelming presence of pro-
government users, be it communication and 
propaganda accounts, partisan journalists or trolls. 
Comparing the number of tweets posted by various 
groups, one can observe that pro-government users 
are the top tweeters regardless of the event in 
question. Obviously, their objective is to “overwhelm 
[their] adversaries” with too much information, and 
to “mobilize their supporters and bind them to the 
state.”73
 Finally, a curious finding is related to the spike 
in tweets posted by pro-government users in 
relation to the U.S presidential election.74 Soon after 
Donald Trump was elected, Turkish social media 
was suddenly flooded with fake news concerning an 
alleged pedophilia scandal that involved the Clinton 
campaign.75 Known as Pizzagate” and originally 
promulgated by Trump supporters in the U.S, this 
non-scandal proved to be popular amongst pro-
AKP users for a couple of reasons. For example, 
the AKP supporters sought to dilute the ongoing 
debate in Turkey concerning a draft bill that would 
decrease sexual assault sentences, drown out critics’ 
concerns about “child brides,”76 and hoped to divert 
attention from the closure of an NGO that focuses 
on children’s rights.77
b) The Pelikan network
In May 2016, a curious blog post, titled the 
“Pelikan Dosyasi” (in a reference to the Hollywood 
movie Pelican Brief) made headlines in Turkish media 
73 E.T. Brooking and P.W. Singer, “War Goes Viral: How 
Social Media is Being Weaponized.” The Atlantic, Novemer 
2016, p. 79
74 Previously, pro-AKP media outlets depicted Trump 
in a negative light because of his Islamophobia and 
xenophobia. However, in the immediate aftermath of 
the coup attempt, the portrayal of Trump suddenly 
turned positive based on the assumption that, if elected, 
Trump would be willing to extradite Fethullah Gulen, the 
Muslim cleric whom the Turkish government accuses of 
masterminding the coup attempt. See, E.K. Sözeri, ‘İktidar 
medyası, İslamofobik Trump’ı nasıl ve neden destekledi’, 
P24 Blog, November 13, 2016, http://p24blog.org/
yazarlar/1851/iktidar-medyasi--islamofobik-trump-i-nasil-
ve-neden-destekledi, (accessed January 14, 2017). 
75 C. Kang, ‘Fake News Onslaught Targets Pizzeria as Nest 
of Child-Trafficking’, The New York Times, November 21, 
2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/technology/
fact-check-this-pizzeria-is-not-a-child-trafficking-site.html, 
(accessed January 14, 2017).  
76 E.K. Sözeri, ‘How the alt-right’s PizzaGate conspiracy 
hid real scandal in Turkey’, The Daily Dot, November 23, 
2015, http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/pizzagate-alt-right-
turkey-trolls-child-abuse/, (accessed January 14, 2017).  
77 C. Kiper, ‘Turkish govt shuts down 370 civic groups, 
raids offices’, AP, November 12, 2016, http://bigstory.
ap.org/article/6cfa6cb4529044c6bd7eb73339ff08de/
turkey-halts-operations-370-civic-groups-raids-offices, 
(accessed January 14, 2017).  
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thanks to its unabashed criticism of the then Prime 
Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu.78 Penned by a journalist 
close to Erdogan, the post exposed the ongoing 
power struggle between the two men. Shortly after 
the publication of the Pelican Brief, Davutoglu 
resigned and an Erdogan-loyalist ascended to the 
premiership. In addition to the intra-party struggles, 
the blog post also revealed the existence of a 
network of pro-Erdogan operatives on Twitter— one 
that is separate from the larger cadre of AK Trolls. 
Based on the leaked emails of Energy Minister 
Berat Albayrak, researchers were able to disclose 
the connections between these operatives, a pro-
government columnist and a partisan think-tank, 
Bosphorus Global.79 This newly-discovered network 
of online operatives were found to be running 
various public communication and information 
projects via 23 different Twitter accounts, and 
associated Facebook pages and websites. Most of 
these projects involved some sort of fact-checking 
service in several languages that aimed to correct 
critical coverage of the AKP government found in 
international media. They also targeted certain 
journalists and media outlets by “name and shame” 
tactics, as can be seen in following examples.80 
78 M. Akyol, ‘How mysterious new Turkish blog exposed 
Erdogan-Davutoglu rift’, Al-Monitor, May 3, 2016, www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/turkey-rift-
between-erdogan-davutoglu.html
79 E.K. Sözeri, ‘Pelikan Derneği: Berat Albayrak, Ahmet 
Davutoğlu’nu neden devirdi?’, Medium, November 3, 
2016, https://medium.com/@efekerem/pelikan-derneği-
berat-albayrak-ahmet-davutoğlunu-neden-devirdi-
5fabad6dc7de, (accessed January 14, 2017).
80 ‘We condemn the international media organs and 
journalists that support military coup in Turkey. 
Here is a list of them:’, @FactCheckingTR on Twitter, 
July 16, 2016, https://twitter.com/FactCheckingTR/
status/754412571323723776, (accessed January 14, 
2017).
Figure 3: @gununyalanlari, a government-linked 
fact-checking service claims that an article that 
apeared in Politico is “a lie.”81
Figure 4: @FactCheckingTR, the English version 
of the government-linked fact-checking service 
makes a similar claim82
81 Alev Scott’un “AK Parti Mültecileri Muhalif Şehirlere 
Gönderiyor” Yalanı, @gununyalanlari on Twitter, 
April 7, 2016, https://twitter.com/gununyalanlari/
status/718166702945472513, (accessed January 14, 
2017).
82 ‘Politico falsely claims that AK Party government 
houses refugees in opposition towns  
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Figure 5: @FactCheckTR_AR, the Arabic version 
of the government-linked fact-checking service 
claims the Politico article in question is “a lie”83
One might argue that these Pelikan-affiliated fact-
checking services are doing what any government 
would naturally do, that is communicating its own 
version of the events. However, in Turkey, these pro-
government operatives who run these social media 
accounts and the so-called fact-checking services 
are not merely trying to set the record straight. They 
are also aiming to harass and intimidate journalists 
as seen in the detention of Dion Nissenbaum, 
Wall Street Journal’s Turkey correspondent. In 
December 2016, an ISIS video in which two Turkish 
http://factcheckingturkey.com/refugees/claim-ak-party-
government-houses-refugees-opposition-towns-194 @
POLITICOEurope @AlevScott’, @FactCheckingTR on Twitter, 
April 6, 2016, https://twitter.com/FactCheckingTR/
status/717709319312183296, (accessed January 14, 
2017).
83 « ادعاء: حكومة حزب العدالة والتنمية تُسْكِنُ اللاجئين في المدن 
المعارضة http://factcheckingturkey.com/ar/refugees/224 
@AlevScott POLITICOEurope», @FactCheckTR_AR on 
Twitter, April 29, https://twitter.com/FactCheckTR_AR/
status/726065932242657280, (accessed January 14, 
2017).
soldiers were burned alive began to circulate on 
social media. The AKP government questioned 
the veracity of the video and prohibited media 
outlets from reporting even its existence. However, 
Nissenbaum had shared a screenshot of the video 
in a tweet and was soon targeted by a member of 
the Pelikan network. This pro-government operative 
reported Nissenbaum to the Turkish National Police 
demanding his “immediate deportation.”84 A week 
later, Nissenbaum was detained for three days 
without access to lawyers. Upon his release, he left 
Istanbul on his own volition.85 
c) Bots
The flooding of the Turkish Twittersphere with 
pro-government messages to push away dissidents 
also relies on the use of bots. According to Norton, 
Turkey has the highest bot population in the EMEA 
region (Europe, Middle East, Africa) with Istanbul 
and Ankara as cities with highest levels of bot 
infestation. In terms of bot density, Turkey ranks 
fifth with one bot per every 1,139 internet users.86 
Norton’s data does not specify the percentage 
of bots that are linked to the AKP, however, in 
2014 two researchers discovered 18,000 bots that 
were tweeting pro-AKP messages during the local 
election campaign.87 Pro-government accounts have 
used bots on other occasions as well, such as after 
bombing attacks,88 primarily to drown out critical 
users from online conversations and to push pro-
84 ‘Wall Street Journal’ın temsilcisi katliam görseli 
RT’liyor. Türkiye’deyse derhal sınırdışı edilmeli!!’ @
DionNissenbaum @EmniyetGM, @Filiz_Gunduz on Twitter, 
December 22, 2016, https://twitter.com/Filiz_Gunduz/
status/812043102588456960, (accessed January 14, 
2017).
85 F. Schwartz and G. Fairclough, ‘Wall Street Journal 
Reporter Dion Nissenbaum Returns to U.S. After Being 
Detained in Turkey,’ The Wall Street Journal, December 31, 
2016, www.wsj.com/articles/turkish-authorities-detain-
wall-street-journal-staff-reporter-dion-nissenbaum-for-
2days-1483191134, (accessed January 14, 2017).
86 https://uk.norton.com/emeabots 
87 E. Poyrazlar, ‘Turkey’s Leader Bans His Own Twitter 
Bot Army,’ Vocativ, March 26, 2014, http://www.vocativ.
com/world/turkey-world/turkeys-leader-nearly-banned-
twitter-bot-army/, (accessed January 16, 2017)
88 Ankara Katliamı Sonrası Aktif Olan Botlar: AK Botlar 
(“Active Bots after the Ankara Massacre: AK Bots”), 
Hafıza Kolektfi, October 25, 2015, http://web.archive.org/
web/20151130041806/http://hafizakolektifi.org/index.
php/2015/10/25/ak-botlar, (accessed January 14, 2017).
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government hashtags to the top of Trending Topic 
lists.89 
d) White hat hackers 
In January 2017, the BTK announced that it would 
set up an “army” of white hat hackers to safeguard 
Turkey from cyberattacks, and organized an online 
contest to select qualified candidates.90 Although 
the TIB established the National Intervention 
Center against Cyber Attacks (known by its 
Turkish acronym USOM) in 2014 and the Ministry 
89 J. de Medeiros, ‘Turkey’s Twitter-Bot army and the 
Politics of Social Media‘ entwickler.de, Juen 30, 2014, 
https://entwickler.de/online/webmagazin/turkeys-twitter-
bot-army-and-the-politics-of-social-media-1153.html 
(accessed January 19, 2017) 
90 B. Simsek, ‘White Hat Hackers Team to Defend Turkey,’ 
Daily Sabah, January 14, 2017, http://www.dailysabah.
com/turkey/2017/01/14/white-hat-hackers-team-to-
defend-turkey (accessed January 19, 2017) 
of Telecommunications already employs 372 
“cyberattack intervention crews,” the BTK maintains 
that there is still a need for an additional “cyber 
army.”91 However, it is not clear if these white hat 
hackers will engage in activities other than securing 
the country’s information and telecommunications 
infrastructure. Given the expansion of online 
surveillance and suppression in recent years, the 
absence of a clear-cut job definition does indeed 
raise concerns. 
91 T. Sardan, ‘Siber Saldiriya Karsi 372 SOME,’ Milliyet, 
January 22, 2016, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/siber-
saldiriya-karsi-372-some--gundem-2182421/, (accessed 
January 19, 2017) 
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Conclusion  
In their analysis of censorship and control of the 
internet around the globe, Deibert and Rohozinski 
discuss first, second and third-generation controls. 
First-generation controls consist of internet filtering 
and blocking; second-generation controls involve 
the passing of legal restrictions, content removal 
requests, technical shutdown of websites, and 
computer-network attacks; and third-generation 
controls include warrantless surveillance, the 
creation of “national cyber-zones,” state-sponsored 
information campaigns, and/or direct physical 
action to silence individuals or groups.92 
As the preceding overview of Turkey’s internet 
policy between the late 1990s and the present 
shows, there has been a marked shift from the 
use of first to third-generation controls, and 
from (more) formal and direct controls to (more) 
informal and indirect practices of suppression. 
This transformation is largely the result of the 
Turkish authorities’ need to adapt to emerging 
digital technologies and their affordances such as 
public deliberation and political engagement. As 
March Lynch notes in his “authoritarian persistence” 
thesis, states adapt to the changes unleashed by 
new communication technologies and learn how to 
use the new powers of the internet as they go. In 
response to emerging cultures of critique and new 
forms of interaction between citizens and the state, 
authoritarian regimes work constantly to contain 
the mediated public sphere, and complement their 
existing filtering, blocking, surveillance systems with 
new strategies that de-centralize and distribute 
control across platforms. 
Between 2007 and 2013, a period when so-called 
harmful online content and communications largely 
transpired on websites, blogs, and social networking 
and collaborative sites (e.g. YouTube, MySpace, 
Dailymotion, Vimeo and Blogspot), Turkish courts 
and administrative entities relied largely on first 
and second-generation controls. However, in the 
aftermath of Gezi protests and the corruption 
scandal in 2013, the AKP government became 
acutely aware of the role of social media platforms 
in political engagement and civic mobilization, and in 
building and expanding of online/offline solidarities. 
92 Deibert and Rohozonski “Control and Subversion” 
Similar to authoritarian regimes that consider the 
free flow of information a threat to their hegemony 
and continuously adapt their media and information 
management strategies to confine the networked 
public sphere, the Turkish government too resorted 
to third-generation controls. In the aftermath of the 
abortive coup in 2016, the AKP has intensified its 
attempts at controlling and taming the online public 
sphere by way of regional internet shutdowns, cloud 
and VPN restrictions, throttling, data localization 
schemes, online “snitching” and prosecution, and 
finally, covert but coordinated propaganda and 
trolling operations.
The shift from formal, direct, hard forms of 
control (e.g. legal and technical restrictions) to 
informal, indirect, soft ones (e.g. throttling, snitching, 
government-sponsored propaganda campaigns) 
also points to the emergence of a decentralized 
and distributed network of online censorship. In 
the 2000s, online controls were implemented by a 
centralized group of identifiable entities (TIB, BTK 
and courts) via identifiable (if not always officially 
acknowledged) strategies such as banning websites, 
forbidding words from domain names, and denying 
access to certain social media content. Beginning 
in 2013 and escalating since 2016, online controls 
have been carried out by a decentralized group that 
includes the BTK, the courts, citizen informants and 
government-affiliated trolls. 
As noted above, the increasing agility and 
diversity of internet controls is a necessity on the 
part of authoritarian governments around the globe 
to maintain and bolster regime stability in the face 
of new political developments. In this regard, it is 
important to discuss the recent changes in Turkey’s 
internet policy with reference to those in China 
and Russia—two authoritarian regimes (to varying 
degrees) whose online control strategies serve as a 
blueprint for budding autocrats around the world. 
Analyses of China’s ICT policies show that Chinese 
authorities rely on “public-private partnerships” 
with the technology industry and a combination of 
control, surveillance and activism. The deployment 
of paid users to assist the government in “monitoring 
content, making favorable comments, and pushing 
discussion toward pro-Party lines” is an indication 
of the emergence of a proactive censorship 
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regime as opposed to a reactive one.93 Similarly, 
Russia has moved beyond “strategies of ‘negative 
control’ of the internet [i.e blocking, censoring, and 
suppressing the flow of communication] toward 
strategies of proactive co-optation [i.e. a deceptive 
blend of control, co-option, and manipulation on 
social media.]”94 As Gunitsky notes,  the Russian 
government, prompted by the anti-government 
protests in 2011-2012, resorted to use social media 
to maintain regime stability, and to this end, it 
mobilized its own supporters (military and business 
elites, regular citizens) and disseminated online 
propaganda, both of which have complemented 
each other and enabled the “planting of false 
information, monitoring of opposition websites, 
harassment of opposition members, and the shaping 
of online discourse and public consciousness.”95 
Russian authorities also formed “web brigades” 
of hundreds of thousands of paid users to write 
positive comments about the government, and thus 
created a mechanism to “control the boundaries of 
acceptable online debate” not simply by “blocking 
dissent but by manipulating it.”96 
93 S. Chestnut Greitens, 2013, “Authoritarianism Online: 
What Can We Learn from Internet Data in Nondemocra-
cies?” Political Science and Politics, 46:2, p. 265
94 Gunitsky, p. 42
95 Gunitsky, op. cit., 46 
96 Gunitsky, op. cit., 47 
As our analysis has shown, the Turkish government 
also opted for a more decentralized set of controls 
in the post-Gezi and post-coup conjunctures. Not 
content with the legal, financial and political silencing 
of critical voices in print and broadcast media, the 
AKP government directed its attention to the last 
bastion of free speech in the country, that is the 
networked online sphere. Buttressing its existing 
“negative” strategies implemented via the BTK and 
the courts, it began to devolve responsibility for 
internet control to partisan journalists, pundits 
and trolls.  Additionally, it secured the active 
engagement of the Turkish National Police, partisan 
media outlets and NGOs, and its own voter base 
to monitor online communications and to file 
complaints against critical or dissenting websites, 
Facebook pages, and Twitter users. In the post-
coup period, the AKP has opted not to develop its 
new censorship and silencing mechanisms into laws 
and regulations, a strategy that resonates with the 
Russian experience.97 By maintaining a high-level 
of opacity to administrative and judicial decisions 
concerning the blocking and banning of content, 
and the prosecution of users, it has engendered a 
sense of uncertainty and uneasiness in the online 
public sphere.
97 C. Vendil Pallin, 2017. “Internet control through owner-
ship: the case of Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 33:1, p. 17 
